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NOTES AND COMMENT
TIME OF ENTRY OF INTERLOCUTORY DECREE OF DIVORCE AS
AFFECTING DATE OF FINAL DECREE. The neglect of parties to
divorce suits to file the interlocutory decree in their respective suit
on the day of rendition or promptly, and, in order to remedy such
omission, the procuring at some subsequent time of the entry of the
interlocutory decree nue pro tune as of the date of rendition, the
entry of final decrees on the last day of the period of six months
which must elapse before a final decree may be lawfully entered, are
practices of omission or commission common enough, and which so
vitally concern the status of the parties interested, as to deserve
the most serious consideration.
Section 988-1 of Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington
(chapter 109, Laws of 1921), the act which established the proceed-
ings now in effect governing divorce, provides.
"At any time after six months have expired, after the
entry of such interlocutory order, and upon conclusion of
an appeal, if taken therefrom, the court, on motion of
either party, shall confirm such (interlocutory) order and
enter a final judgment granting an absolute divorce, from
which no appeal shall lie."
It will be observed that this statute authorizes the entry of final
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judgment at any time "after six months have expired after the
entry of" the interlocutory decree. It must be borne in mind
that the word "entry" as used in the quoted section has a definite
meaning in this jurisdiction. A judgment is "made or rendered"
when the court announces its decision, and the judgment is "en-
tered" when the decision expressed in writing and signed by the
court-the formal written judgment-is "filed" with the clerk of
the court.' In view of this signification of the word "entry," it is
manifest that a final decree cannot be had prior to the expiration of
six months from the time a formally written interlocutory decree,
signed by the judge, has been filed with the clerk. In other words,
a final decree of divorce cannot be secured until after six months
have expired after the filing with the clerk of the court of the
interlocutory order granted in the suit. And, of course, a final
decree cannot be obtained while an appeal from the interlocutory
decree is pending. The date of filing the interlocutory decree must
be taken as the date from which the six months must be computed,
and not the date on which the interlocutory decree was signed
by the court. This view is supported by decisions in California
from which the divorce law of this (Washington) state was de-
rived. There the statute provides
"When one year has expired after the entry of such
interlocutory judgment, the court on motion of either
party, or upon its own motion, may enter the final judg-
ment granting divorce, * *, but if any appeal is taken
from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new
trial, final judgment shall not be entered until such mo-
tion or appeal has been finally disposed of, nor then, if
the motion has been granted or judgment reversed."2
In a divorce suit there, after trial, the court entered an order in
the minutes reciting, "it is ordered by the court that an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce be entered herein in favor of the plaintiff
on the grounds of defendant's wilful neglect and desertion." No
findings were filed, no further proceedings had, and no deeree
entered. More than a year after the making of the minute entry,
motion was made for a final decree, which was denied. On appeal
the Supreme Court of California said
"We hold that the proper construction of section 132
of the Civil Code (above quoted), " I I an interlocutory
decree of divorce must be entered in the judgment book
one year before a final decree can be granted. 0 * *"3
Since the period of six months begins to run only from the time
of actual entry of the interlocutory decree, an interlocutory decree
cannot be entered nunc pro tune as of the day it was rendered
but not then actually entered, and be made effective as of that
day to start the running of the six months. This period will begin
'Morley v. Morley, 130 Wash. 77, 226 Pac. 132 (1924) Brown v.
Brown, 31 Wash. 397, 72 Pac. 86 (1903) Quarles v. Seattle, 26 Wash. 226,
66 Pae. 389 (1901).
2Sec. 132, Cal. Civ. Code.
Smith v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 336, 82 Pac. 79 (1905)
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to run only from the actual date of entry of the interlocutory de-
cree. Tins is the rule in California. In a case there, an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce was entered September 15, 1904, nune pro
tune as of September 4, 1903. On September 21, 1904, the plain-
tiff applied for a final decree, winch was refused on the ground
the formal interlocutory decree entered nune pro tune as of Sep-
tember 4, 1903, was not in fact or actually entered until September
15, 1904, that, therefore, one year had not passed since the date
of actual entry, and that it was the latter date, and not the theoreti-
cal entry thereof winch fixed the time from which the period should
run for entry of final decree. Of tins state of facts, the Supreme
Court of California said.
"We think the defendant is correct in is position that
the year winch must elapse before final judgment can be
given begins to run from the time of actual entry of the
anterloeutory judgment, and not from any theoretical nune
pro tune date of entry "I
In another case, the suit was tried June 28, 1909. On June 28,
1910, the interlocutory decree was signed, together with an order
"that the foregoing decree be entered nune pro tune as of June 28,
1909." Tis decree was entered July 5, 1910, as of June 28, 1909.
On July 1, 1910, a final decree of divorce purporting to be based
upon the interlocutory decree so entered nunc pro tune was signed
by the judge, and entered July 6, 1910. On November 12, 1912,
the court, on its own motion, entered an order setting aside and
vacating said final decree, "because it was entered within a week
after the actual entry of the interlocutory decree of divorce."
Considering an appeal from tins order, the appellate court said,
"if .. -- an interlocutory decree in like form as the one
that was entered in 1910, had been signed on June 28,
1909, by the judge who tried the case, and had been de-
livered to the clerk for filing, and if without filing or
entry of such decree the same was lost by the clerk, these
would be circumstanees strongly appealing to the court
in the exercise of its judgment favorably to the request of
the plaintiff that the decree be entered as of the date
of the trial.
"It is well established that, where a judgment has been
rendered and its entry omitted, it may be subsequently
entered, and, if justice requires, may be made to take
effect nune pro tune as of the date it was actually made.
(Cites cases.)
"The order setting aside the final decree is not necessar-
ily based upon the lack of authority of the court to enter
its interlocutory decree nune pro tune as of the date when
it was rendered, but is based upon the ground that the
court has no power to enter a final decree until the ex-
piration of one year after the entry of the interlocutory
decree."
I Claudius v. Melvin, 146 Cal. 257, 79 Pac. 897 (1905).
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And the court further said (quoting Spencer v. Troutt5 )
" 'It hardly requires argument or authority to establish
the proposition that a court cannot by antedating an
order, or the entry of it, cut off the right of a party to
move for a new trial, to move to set the judgment aside, or
to appeal. These rights, * * * cannot be lost to a party
by such action, whether the effect was designed or not.'9 * * while the power of a court over its records, in
order to make them speak the truth, is fully recognized,
and for that purpose errors or omissions in the entry of
judgments may in some instances be corrected by enter-
ing them as of the date when rendered, the full effect
of the nunc pro tune order is limited so as to prevent re-
sults not contemplated by the law There seems to be no
reason why such limitation should not apply to the estab-
lished time when the right to a final judgment of divorce
will accrue, in the same manner that it applies to the
time when an appeal may be taken, * * '-
it * :r we are satisfied * - * that a final decree of
divorce could not be entered until one year after the
actual entry of the interlocutory decree. The language
of section 131 contemplates that a final decree shall not
be entered until after the expiration of the time in which
an appeal may be taken from the interlocutory decree,
nor during the pendency of such appeal if taken. As we
have seen, the entry of the interlocutory decree nunc pro
tune as of the earlier date does not affect the time pre-
scribed within which an appeal may be taken.6
The provisions of the divorce law
"interpreted in the light of previous legislation and deci-
sions and the purpose to be accomplished by the law, are
clearly to be understood as a limitation on the power
of the court in the matter, and as intended to forbid the
entry of a final judgment until after the prescribed
period. * * I
"The law in question was intended as a limita-
tion upon the power of the court with respect to the sub-
ject-matter, so that the court shall not be competent to
grant a final divorce at any time during the year suc-
ceeding the interlocutory judgment, and as to require
that the interlocutory judgment be first entered. The par
ties could not waive these proceedings, nor invest power
in the court by their consent or acquiescence. The pur
pose of the statute is to provide that in any event and
under all circumstances there shall be an interval of one
year after the party is declared to be entitled to a divorce
before it can become absolute.7
Spencer v. Troutt, 133 Cal. 605, 65 Pac. 1083 (1901)
6 Nolte v. Nolte, 29 Cal. App. 126, 154 Pac. 873 (1915).
'Gran nx v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 245, 79 Pac. 891, 894, 895, 106 Am.
St. Rep. 23 (1905)
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The foregoing interpretation of the law
"necessarily leads to the conclusion that a final decree of
divorce could not be entered until one year after the actual
entry of the interlocutory decree."'8 (Italics ours.)
That the California decision in Nolte v. Nolte, supra, may and
should be regarded as a sound precedent in this (Washington)
state, is manifest when it is considered that here the time for
appeal from a final judgment (and an interlocutory decree of
divorce is such under the divorce statute), begins to run from
the time the judgment is "entered", that is, from the day the
formal written judgment, signed by the court, is filed with the
clerkY And the Supreme Court of this state has declared.
"An appellant cannot be deprived of his right of ap-
peal by the entry of a nunc pro tune order. If this were
not so, he could be deprived of his right of appeal by the
court taking under advisement the determination of a
motion for a new trial for a period of ninety days or
longer, and then entering a nune pro tune order." 10
In New York the statute provides a final decree of divorce may
be obtained three months "after the entry" of the interlocutory
decree. It is there held an interlocutory decree cannot be entered
nune pro tune to effect an entry as of that date, for
"If an interlocutory decree may be entered nune pro tune,
there is no logical reason why it may not be actually en-
tered the day before the final decree is entered. The sub-
version of the purpose of the (statute) which would thus
be possible, ' * * affords sufficient reason for refusing to
adopt the practice of entering nune pro tune an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce.""
There are decisions holding a divorce decree may be entered
nune pro tune, 2 but these are not precedents here. In some of these
cases' 3 the statutes considered made judgments effective when ren-
dered, and made it the clerk's duty to enter judgments when an-
nounced or rendered. Nune pro tune entries were allowed to
remedy omissions of the clerk. In another one 4 the court had
$Nolte v. Nolte, note 6.9Mathison v. Anderson, 107 Wash. 617, 182 Pac. 622 (1919) Reynolds
v. Pacific Marine Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 666, 178 Pac. 811 (1919) Rupe v.
Kemp, 99 Wash. 371, 169 Pac. 871 (1918) Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. Ry.
Co., 92 Wash. 670, 159 Pac. 782 (1916) Gust v. Gust, 70 Wash. 695, 127
Pac. 292 (1912) Robertson v. Shine, 50 Wash. 433, 97 Pac. 497 (1908).
20Reeves v. Wilson, 105 Wash. 318, 177 Pac. 825 (1919).
"Townsend v. Townsend, 100 N. Y. S. 464 (1906).
"In re Cook's Estate, 77 Cal. 220, 17 Pac. 923, 19 Pac. 431, 11 Am. St.
Rep. 267, 1 L. R. A. 567 (1888), (This under an earlier statute having pro-
visions unlike that now in force in that state, which latter is the one con-
strued in the other California decisions heretofore cited) Mock v. Chaney,
36 Colo. 60, 87 Pac. 538 (1906) Moster 'v. Moster 53 Mo. 326 (1873)
Curnen v. Curnen, 155 App. Div. 536, 140 N. Y. S. 805 (1913), (construing
Massachusetts law) Rush v. Rush, 97 Tenn. 279, 37 S. W 13 (1896)
Zahorka v. GeitA, 129 Wis. 498, 109 N. W 552 (1906)
" In re Cook's Estate, Mock v. Chaney, Rush v. Rush, Zahorka v.
Geith, all in note 12.
" Moster v. Moster, note 12.
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denied a divorce, but the. clerk's entry of judgment showed a
divorce was granted, and a nune pro tune entry allowed to correct
this error. In yet another of these eases' the statute provided for
a decree nisi, to be final in six months unless the court ordered
othbrwise, and by statute nune pro tune entry of judgment was
authorized. The difference between the system of entering judg-
ments in this state, and the system obtaining in California and con-
sidered in the case of Cook's Estate,16 is made plain by the state-
ment of the latter system in this case. It is therein said
"The judgment is a judicial act of the court, the entry
is the ministerial act of the clerk. The judgment is as
final when pronounced by the court as when it is entered
and recorded by the clerk, as required by statute. * * "
there is no statutory provision for the signing of a judg-
ment by the judge, either before or after its entry, and
his signature gives it no additional solemnity or validity
* *- when, after the trial and final submission of the
case, the court pronounces a judgment in apt language
which finally determines the rights of the parties to the
action, and leaves nothing more to be done except the
ministerial act of the clerk in entering it, and especially
when what the court has pronounced has been entered in
the minutes, then the judgment has been rendered, and
the rights of the parties established. * * I an appeal from
a final judgment must be taken within one year from the
rendition of the judgment. The time begins to run from
the time when the judgment was rendered, not from the
time when it is entered."
The principle on which the entry of judgments nunc pro tune
is sustained is that such action is necessary in furtherance of jus-
tice, and to save a party from unjust prejudice through delay
caused by the act of the court or the course of judicial procedure.
To support a nune pro tune entry the delay in entering the judg-
ment must either be solely the fault of the court, or, at least, not
attributable to the laches of the party in whose favor the practice
is resorted to. In other words, the practice is intended merely to
make sure that we shall not suffer for an event he could not
avoid.17 As said in Freeman on Judgments .11
"But with respect to proceedings which depend upon
and date from the entry of the judgment, they cannot be
affected by the fact that the entry is nune pro tune."
The statute in question fixes the date of entry of the interlocu-
tory decree as the arbitrary, definite, fixed date or point of time
from which the six months period begins to run. The entry of a
judgment is not the ministerial duty of the clerk, the entry or
filing is a duty of the parties to the divorce suit. Their failure
"Curnen v. Curnen, note 12.
"Note 12.
" n re Finks, 224 Fed. 92 (1915).Is 5th ed., sec. 139, p. 264.
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to enter the judgment is not an omission of the clerk to perform
Ins ministerial duty, remediable by a nune pro tune order of the
court. It is their own fault, and so not within the principle gov-
ermng the entry of judgments nunc pro tune, and not to be
remedied by the exercise of that power of the court.
As the statute declares,
"At any time after six months have exptred after the
entry"
of the interlocutory order and upon conclusion of an appeal, if an
appeal be taken therefrom, a final judgment may be obtained, the
italicized words in the above quoted clause make it manifestthat
the full period of six months from, after and exclusive of the date
of entry of the interlocutory decree must elapse before a final
decree of divorce may be enterd. In other words, six full calendar
months must intervene between and exclusive of the date of entry
of the interlocutory order and date of entry of the final decree.
If the latter be entered on the last day of the six months period,
it is void, because jurisdiction to enter a final decree does not
exist until the full period specified has elapsed. In New York the
divorce statute provides.
"No final judgment annulling a marriage or divorcing
the parties and dissolving the marriage, shall be entered,
* 1 0 until after the expiration of three months after the
filing of the decision of the court or report of the referee.
After the expiration of said period of three months final
judgment shall be entered."
There it is held that application for final decree can be made only
"when three months shall have expired from the date of filing
the interlocutory judgment."'
F C. HAOKMAN.
- Gibson V. Gibson, 81 N. Y. S. 343 (1903). And see Phillips v. PAU-
Zips, 92 N. Y. S. 78 (1904).
